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THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL-INTENSIVE AGRICULTUR
ON PEASANT SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A CASE STUDY
The contact between so-called "capitalistic" (i 0 e, capital-intensive)
forms of economic organization and so-called "pre-capitalistic" (ioe.
labor-intensive) forms of economic organization has most commonly been
described as leading simply to disruptive consequences0 The capital-
intensive intrusion is seen as weakening or destroying the social context
within which the pre-capitalist sector is set0 A common formulation of
this sort of "degenerative" contact situation is that the people on the
pre-capitalist side lack the dynamism, the elasticity of wants and the
industriousness of the people on the capitalist side, so that the
appearance of money, of rossibilities for wage work, and of the opportunity
to buy mass -, produced goods on the open market, in, say, a peasant society,
leads necessarily to indebtedness, a loss of self-respect and a disappearince
of native skills. The excesses of colonialism and imperialism, the anomie
the growth. of industrialism has produced in certain parts of our own
society, and the clearly anti-traditional impact of capital intensive
industry wherever it has appeared, have all strengthened this pessimistic
view concerning the necessary outcome of contact between industrial and
non-industrial society.
1This paper, delivered at the 1956 annual meeting of the Society for
Applied Anthropology is a summary of one part of a longer essay tracing the
development of a town-village complex in eastern Central Java, published by
the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
References and acknowledgements have been omitted from this summary and may
be found in the original manuscript.
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2Yet with the interest in the developnmt of economically "under-
developed" areas, the problem of contact between "capitalist" and "pre-
capitalist" patterns is coming to be reassessed and to be investigated
in zuch greater detail, for the possibility of development of such areas
through capital transfers from economically more advanced areas rests
on the possibility that such transfers can be effected in a manner
which will lead not to social and cultural deterioration but to re-
constructiono The pessimism of the older views,, linked as they often
were to policies aimed at maintaining a stable relationship between
advanced industrial areas and non-industrial ones, has now come to be
challenged by an optimism, linked with a policy designed to close the
gap between the two sorts of areas, And where the earlier view tended
to err in the direction of underestimating the positive effects of
contact between "capitalist" and "pre-capitalist" forms of economic
organization, the newer views tend often to underestimate the
difficulties involved in such contact, to oversimplify the problem by
assuming the essentially stimulative effects of modern industrial
patterns to be so strong that they will, so long as they are introduced
in sufficient strength and in a sufficiently short period of time,
inevitably turn the receiving country toward a developmental pattern.,
that the indigenous socio-cultural patterns are mare "barriers" to be
overcome by heavy injections of imported capital.
The position taken in this paper is: 1) that a oapital-intensive
form of economic organisation introduced into a traditional social structure
may under certain conditions comw to act as an engine for economic develop-
ment, may stimulate reform of the traditional struc2ture toward a morv
productive pattern of adaptation 2) that the ways in which such stimlation
3can fail to occur, in which the juncture of modern forms of economic
organization and traditional ones can misfire leading to cultural dis-
integration on the part of the economically weaker group, are more
numerous and more easily realised than the ways in which it can go right;
and, 3) that the most important set of variables determining the difference
between the two outcomes-the developmental and the anti-developmental--
are broadly cultural and social rather than narrowly economic.
It is in such a light as this that I intend to look at the contact
between European introduced and managed commercial agriculture and peasant
society in a small region in Central Java during the years immediately
before the war 0 I wish to show that there were essentially creative as
well as destructive elements implicit in this contact, and that, although
the creative elements were smothered by colonial policies in the name of
moderating the destructive elements, they offer hope for the future now
that the political context of contact is altered. I wish to emphasize that
in judging the welfare consequences of a novel form of economic activity
for a traditional social structure, one must be careful to distinguish those
elements which are implicit in the economic facts as such and those which
are the result of more broadly cultural factors, and that economic planning
for underdeveloped areas demands a more careful and positive treatment of
such cultural factors than one which merely regards them as r ;sidual
"barriers to be overcome."
In 1953-54, 1 was a member of a seven-man team study'.ng a town-village
complex in the eastern part of Central Java, which i enat call Modjokuto.
Modjokuto is the name of a town, a subdistrict and a districto The town
is the seat of government for both the subdistrict and the district, and is
han important commercial center for the whole area. The subdistrict is about
thirty square miles in extent and includes within it eighteen "village
clusters," while the district is about seventy-five square miles and
consists of five subdistricts, including that of Modjokuto itself, As the
town lies at the southeastern edge of the Brantas river valley, there is
within the district a good deal of variation in landscape type and, conse-
quently, of land use, To the east of town, the land breaks rather quickly
into foothills which lead, ultimately, to a group of large active volcanoes.
Southward, the country, though only somewhat broken, is either forested or
increasingly dry and unirrigable. Thus, although there are some rice fields
on all sides of the town, it is to the northwest that the most fertile,
irrigable rice-bowl land lies.
In the high mountain areas the most characteristic crops are the
more cool climate vegetables--cabbages, squashes and even potatoes, but
though some of these vegetables flow through Modjokuto on their way else-
where, the bulk of them do not, so that the importance of this area for
the town is, relatively speaking, small0  On the dryer, slightly elevated,
land to the south, Dutch private enterprise had a quite extensive plantation
system-sugar, coffea, rubber, sisal, tapioca--before the war. During the
war, squatters were invited on to much of this land by the Japanese occupa-
tion government. The migrants were given small parcels of land to farm
and have remained in place since the war, despite some governmental attempts
to remove them. On the rice bowl land, where most of the population is
settled, one finds, of course, the labor-intensive, flooded-field, double-
crop agriculture characteristic of Java more or less generally, and of
Central Java particularly: rice is grown during the wet monsoon; corn,
soya-bean, peanuts, etc., in the dry.
A labor intensive agriculture plus a high and growing population
means that the primary economic problem for the peasant is to get land
and labor together in the right amounts at the right time. As a result,
village social structure typically consists of an integration of political,
religious, and economic activities within a traditionalized distribution
of land rights on the one hand and rights over labor on the other. The
land side of the, equation is expressed in a system of land tenure in which
a set of villagers--the so-called "kernel" villagers--are seen as descendants
of the man or men who originally cleared and settled the village. Each
of these villagers has a small unit of land over which he has life-long use
rights which are unalienable and indivisable, though they are inheritable
by one or another of his children. If a nuclear villager dies without
heirs, commits a crime or leaves the village, the land is redistributed
to a waiting candidate who lives in the village but who does not yet owM
a share of such land. As the village leaders have extra land rights as
perquisites of their offices, a "natural" class ranking tends to form
around this tenure system. At the top are the village leaders; after them
the nuclear villagers who have shares in the village rice land; beneath
them the candidates who own only house land; and at the bottom are those
who own nothing and board with others0 The labor exchange system is also
an explicit one, involving different sorts of patterns appropriate to
different economic and social contexts, and closely tied in with the land
tenure patterns0
This picture of village social structure is, admittedly, an ideal-
typical model stressing the more traditional aspects of rurallife and
as such is, to a certain degree, false to the facts in Modjokuto. The
6growth of private property, monetization and urbanization, to say nothing
of the increased landlessness resulting from the rising population, has
significantly blurred the edges of the underlying pattern. Nevertheless,
though the traditional village social structure has been strained and
weakened by the kinds of developments we usually associate with increas-
ing urbanization, it has far from been destroyed by them. It has, in
fact, proved remarkably capable of absorbing a very dense population with-
out developing a sharp class segregation of haves and have-nots. Rather
than a concentration of land holdings and a disenfranchised proletariat,
there has occurred a fractionization of both the land tenure and labor
rights side of the equation so that the structure can contain more people:
thus, several villages in the Modjokuto area recently doubled their number
of nuclear citizens by halving the holdings of each citizen; thus, complicated
tenancy, sub-tenancy, renting and sub-renting patterns have developed which
allow a greater number of people to claim a small portion of agricultural
output from a single piece of land. Such a social structure, its agricul-
tural base growing more and more labor intensive, thus holds an increasing
number of people on the land through a pattern I have called elsewhere
"shared poverty," a kind of super-saturated solution of land and people
sustained at a level of living only slightly above subsistence*
But it has not always been so. Modjokuto was only settled from
about 1850 on and so was, before the turn of the century, something of a
frontier area, and had, as a result, a looser sort of socio-economic
structure than was common in the already heavily populated regions of Central
Java, out of which most of the settlers had come and where the classic
Javanese civilization was centered, Wet rice cultivation took up a rather
7smaller proportion of the land in Modjokuto than in Central Java, while
dry fields and grasing lang took up a rather larger proportion And
the ecological pattern was a more open, flexible mode of adaptation,
seemingly capable of development in any one of several directions,
However, after a brief period of expansion when it seemed possible
that rather distinctive--for Java-social, cultural and ecological
patterns were in the process of developing, patterns which might have
led to a more dynamic sort of society, the economic histary of the
rural area is one of a progressive rigidification toward the typically
Central Javanese modes of land use, social organisation and cultural
outlook, a replication, with some differences, of the essentially
static village society of the great rice plain areas0
One of the chief determining factors in this pattern of develop-
ment was the plantation system0 The first plantation in the area
was set up in 1879 on the basis of a seventy-five year lease of Govern-
ment-owned "waste" (ioeo, unsettled) land. By 1875, there were five or
six more underway, and by 1925, at the height of the expansion, there were
ten sugar mills, three tapioca mills and two sisal mills spotted around
the countryside within a twenty mile radius of the town0 But, ven
more important, from the point of view of its effect on Javanese life,
the sugar mills, which could not grow their crop very efficiently on
the dry lands to the south, rented about 2,500 acres of the best sub-
district rice land a year from the village peasants for cane-growingo
The system was for the mals to contract leases through the village
chiefs with whole villages for a twenty-one and one-half year period.
Each eighteen months a different one-third of each village's rice land
was surrendered to the company, the reminder being left to the peasants
8to till as they wished. As the sugar companies were renting, again
around 1925, somewhere around 25% of the wet-rice land in the sub-
district each year, vs. a Java-wide average of 6%, it is clear
that Modjokuto before the war can properly be referred to as a
"sugar area."
Some idea of the general size and shape of the expansion can
be gathered from the fact that the volume of freight carried by the
local railroad increased nearly forty-fold between 1900 and 1929, that
the per hectare sugar rents paid to peasants doubled from 1913 to 1924,
that piece work wages rose about 20% in the same period and prices of
most staples about 50%. Thus a study of the general area made in
1924 summed up the direct effect on the Javanese population of this
burst of expansion in capital intensive agriculture in three generaliza-
tions:
1. Manual laborers were in a poorer position at the height
of the expansion than they had been at the beginning of
it.
2. Small landholders who could not make a complete living
out of their land were even worse off.
3. The larger landholders were gaining in welfare.
The plantation economy stimulated a change toward larger holdings
and the proletarianisation of marginal peasants. As the Dutch sugar
managers contracted both land for renting and seasonal labor through
the village chiefs, this group tended to benefit differentially from
the expansion of commercial agriculture. Other individuals, somewhat
well-off to begin with, benefited in similar ways, for the mills often
lent money to favored Javanese to buy up land on the condition that it
would then be rented to the mill on the mill's terms. Also, although
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planting was carried out by a seasonal work force organized under
permanent foremen, sugar grown on peasant land was of ten harvestid under
contract by somewhat mre prosperous peasunts. These peasants were given
oxen by the mills as an advance and hired their own day laborers, trans--
porting the cane to the railroad. Such contracting was, evidently, quite
profitable for these agrarian entrepreneurs and, as village chiefs usually
gave out these contracts, it was quite profitable for them too.
There grew up, consequently, something of a larger landholders class,
made up of village chiefs and other well-to-do peasants. These larger land-
holders, in addition to being labor hirers and harvested under contract
by somewhat more prosperous peasants. These peasants were given axen by
the mills as an advance and hired their own day laborers, transporting
the cane to the railroad. Such contracting, was, evidently, quite
profitable for these agrarian entrepreneurs and, as village chiefs usually
gave out these contracts, it was quite profitable for them too.
There grew up, consequently, something of a larger landholders class,
made up of village chiefs and other well-to-do peasants. These larger
landholders, in addition to being labor hirers and harvest contractors,
were, commonly, "money lenders" as well, though they rost often lent
in the form of consumption goods-coffee, rice, textiles--at, of course,
exorbitant rates. With factory credit or personal savings some of them
bought agricultural equipment--ozen, ploughs, hoes-which they resold, lent
or rented to small peasants or to their tenants, and they traded in t he
dry season cash crops which were coming increasingly to be cultivated at
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this time. They even tended, in several cases, to develop a new settlement
pattern, moving out from the solidly settled village block to live in
isolated and (relatively speaking) palatial splendor in the middle of
their fields.
Here we would seem to have--ignoring for the moment the racial caste
elements involved in the colonial nature of the organization of this whole
pattern--a collection of some of the same elements which accom;panied
development in England in the 16th and 17th centuries: rising prices, a
moderate decline in real wages, higher rents, increasing technical
afficiency, consolidation of landholdings and enclosures and at leas
the beginning of a renuine rural "middle class" of slightly larger
landholders. As in England, the structure of the economy was changing
so as to bring the size of the agricultural productive unit more into
line with the abilities of tie rural farmer to manage resources, to come to
terms with the limited divisibilities of capital and organization as
factors of production, so as to riake free-hold agriculture rore a
nbusinesslike" and less a "subsistence" proposition. There are altogether
crucial differences between the two developments; but the point is that,
for a brief period, the plantation system threatened to force a complete
reorganization of the Javanese peasant economy in the Modjokuto area.
That it did not succeed in doing so was primarily due to three facts:
1) the boom was short lived and collapsed almost entirely; 2) the form
in which the plantation pattern impinged on the indi-enous subsistence
pattern tended to mitigate its transformative effects; and, 3) the
indigenous pattern was deeply rooted.
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The depression was as severein the East Indies as anywhere else in the
world, and the collapse of the international sugar market sent the plan-
tations skidding down an incline from which they never really recovered.
But the other, less purely economic, aspects of the problem, those con-
cerned with the special nature of the interaction between commercial and
subsistence agriculture in the Modjokuto area, are even more interesting
from a theoretical point of view, for they suggest that certain social
and cultural factors were confining the impact of "capitalist" organi-
zation of agriculture on the traditional village economy along very
circumscribed lines and might have continued to do so had world comm-odity
prices remained stable.
From both sides, the Javanese and the Dutch, there were strong. social
and cultural forces actirr against the changes "capitalist". organization
of production was tending to stimulate. On the Javanese side, the main
conservative force was, of course, the village tradition of Central
Java which the peasants would naturally tend to replicate in Modjokuto if
the social and ecological conditions within which they found themselves
were capable of supporting? it. On the Dutch side, the conservative force
was the central desire of all imperialist enterprises: the wish to bring
a people's products into the world economy, but not the people themselves,
to have onefs economic cake and eat it too by producing "capitalist" goods
with "pre-capitalist" workers on "pre-capitalist" land. As a result.
the sugar plantations aimed at an inherently self-contradictory goal:
they needed to keep Javanese society flexible enough so that its land
and labor could be employed toward the production of goods saleable on
international markets, and yet keep it rigid enough to prevent it changing
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in a "capitalist" direction, which would raise their wale and rent costs0
Thus at the same time as their more econoric activities were producing the
structural changes I have just described, their political and social
policies were tending to re-create in Modjokuto the conditions under
which the traditional Javanese village system would persist and grow
stronger.
The plantations' reinforcement of the traditional village way of life
took three forms: 1) by restricting their interestsso far as peasant
owned land was concerned, to sugar, which demands a highly irrigated
environment similar to that of rice, anad confining other sorts of commercial
cultivation to unsettled lands, they reproduced in Modjokuto the sort
of ecological setting characteristic of Central Java where the traditional
village pattorns of adaptation were centered; 2) by attempting to control
the processes of production all the way down to the raw material level,
the plantations hindered the development of a class of independent agri-
cultural entrepreneurs; 3) by keeping their labor force maximally seasonal,
their wages low and preventing: -obility for Javanese upward through the
ranks of their organization, the plantations encouraged the formation of
a very large partial proletariat composed of worker peasants who were
neither wholly on the "pre-capitalist" nor wholly on the "capitalist"
side of the dual economy, but who moved uneasily back and forth between the
two in response to the movement of sugar prices.
Taking the first point, sugar is, in a tropical wet-rice country, an
almost ideal commercial crop because its environmental demands so closely
approximate those of rice, particularly in the fact that an increase in the
intensity of irritation is in both cases a paramount technical prerequisite
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to increased productivity. Thus, the plantations' decision to grow sugar on
peasant land, and so make a large investment in improved irrigation facilities
was also almost necessarily a decision to increase the Javanese production
of rice, As indibated above, the whole of the Modjokuto area up until
shortly after the turn of the century was characterised both by a relatively
low population density and a low "rice terrace density;" i.e., terraces
were interspersed with large expanses of unirrigated land. With the rather
sudden increase in capital investment in improved irrigation facilities in
the early part of the century, the river basin closed up into the highly
populated, thickly terraced, intensively worked countryside it has since
become. The heavy emphasis on irrigation at the expense of other kinds
of capital improvement in agriculture--e.g., those concerned with stimu-
lating a medium scale mixed farming pattern of wet and dry crop cultivation
plus animal husbandry--encouraged the development in Modjokuto of the
classical Central Javanese pattern by recreating the environment to
which it is adaptive. By utilizing the Javanese-owned land in a mono-
cultural manner and reservin diversific ation of c apital intensive comnercial
"waste" to lands where peasant living patterns were not directly involved,
the plantation companies enocouraged an essentially anti-developmental form
of land use on the part of the Javanese. It'was (and is) anti-developmental
despite the great diversification of crops, because it implied a steady
increase in labor intensification(and soao population density) up to some
high and probably still unreached limit and a maintenance of the largely
uncapitalized, two and half to five acre "liliputian" farm characteristic
of so much of Java.
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The close and careful control over the growirrr of the cane upon which
the miLs insisted also had a stultifyin eifeat on the peasant economy.,
The undeniably improved efficiency of this sort of vertical integration
was ained at the cost of a tendency to reduce the landownirg peasant's
role to that of a passive rentier livin mindlessly off the proceeds of
his sugar rents. The planning of land utilization became the business
of the plantations, cdstroying peasant initiative: "in place of peasant
ingeniousness came a new coolie submissiveness," to quote the Dutch economa-ist
GH, van der Kolff. Even the peasant's initiative in planning; the third
half of his land not at the 1,ioment in sugar was interfered with, for the
companies paid premiums to peasants who would leave the land fallow in the
off period, Such a system is not likely to produce what Van der Kolff
rightly regards as one of Java's greatest needs: a "virile yeomanry,"
Rather, it waould seem likely to produce an effete gentry whose increased
incomes were drained off into luxury consumptions. And from reports of the
fine furnishings, fancy clothes and elaborate homes some of the sugar
parvenus provided themselves with, that is what,, in part, occured.,
Only in part, howevere That the rentier reaction was not the only
one, not even, perhaps, the dominant one, is indicated not only by
the -rowfng cultivation, premiums and all, of non-rice crops on the
terrace in the dry monsoon, but also by the increasin- interest of peasant
in growing their own cane. Plantation and Government policy opposed this
development strenuously and in 1920 8 law was passed forbidding the
purchase of free-hold cane by the mills. Even so, the spontaneous Javanese
interest in independent sugar cultivation nearly doubled the value of
free-hold -ane from 1926 to 1923, nost of the output going to Javanese
run mills producing crude sugar on a sallc for domestic onumpieon,-
Thus there is evidence that, Piven a free hand, a certain sector of the new
landholding "iddle class" would iave reacted to the stimulus provided
by the sugar mills with an entrepreneurial rather than a rentier
pattern of economic behavior0 In fact, a more open system would have
tended to select the frugal, shrewdly calculating and economically
imaginative sort of "yeoman" out for success rather than the coupon
clipping sort of "country gentleman" Uhe renting system favored,
Having haMered the growth both of a larger scale, more
efficient farm unit, as well as of a more self-reliant, aggressive
farm manager to run it, both of which their economic activities were
in fact tending to stimulate in spite of their policies, the planta-
tions also followed a labor policy which hampered the growth of a
permanent proletariato By keeping their work force maximally seasonal.
the Dutch prevented the formacion of a "professional" working class
wholly within the "capitalist" sector of the dual economy, avoiding,
in part, agitation by such workers for better treatment as workers,
rather than as colonial dependent. e. Further, the "spectroscopic"
organization of the sugar industry (pure caucas- ids in the managerial
roles, pure mongoloids in the unskilled roles and mixed Eurasians in
between) prevented the cleverer and more energetic Javanese from
important advances upward through the industry, so dampening permanent
motivations to activities outside of subsistence agriculture. The
pattern of shifting land rented, so as to rent only one-third of any
single peasant's land in any one year had a similar effect. for it
allowed marginal peasants to hang on much longer as paIrt-time cultiva-
tors, thus weakening the pressures on ,he mil to raise wages, t
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stabilize their labor force or to finance relief measures for un-
employed workers, who, it was argued, could always go back to the
land. By keeping the marginal peasant with one foot in the rice
terrace and one in the sugar mills, the Dutch managers were able
to keep the Javanese worker's share of the returns from the increasing
productivity of the sugar industry minimal and their own profits
maximal.
In sum, the policies of the plantation companies had an anti-
developmental effect upon the Javanese agrarian economy in the
Modjokuto area, and these policies were not implicit in the capital
intensive form of operation the companies followed, but were, in fact,
rather in opposition to the more stimulating effects they were tend-
ing to have on the peasant economgr; they were intended to dampen
rather than enhance the intrinsically transformative effects of
capitalist economic organization on a traditional structure. The
policy of segregating the Javanese social structure from the effects
of Western enterprise was not so much a result of the obstacles
presented to social change by a high and growing population, great
labor intensification and a lack of "capitalist spirit" as it was
one of the primary factors involved in the progressive strengthening
of these admittedly formidable obstacles. It has been a combination
of traditional social structure able to distend so as to absorb a much
increased personnel without unmanageable interna1l strain; a form of
intensive, near horticultural agriculture on excellent, well-irrigated
soils which could almost indefinitely provide at least a slight
marginal return for an added unit of labor; and a form of commercial
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agriculture which shoved a large percentage of its costs off on to
the village economy without allowing that economy to share more
than minimally in the increased returns, which has produced the
present rigid, overcrowded, undynamic situation. Not, of course,
that the sugar plantations caused the population rise: forms of
economic production and population are, at least in the short run,
f airly independent of one another and result from constellations of
different variables, It is merely that, given the rising population,
the sugar plantations, which were the chief dynamic factors in the
situation followed a mode of operation which led not to a turn toward
self-sustaining development, but to stasis on a "higher" levela
Before the development of the sugar industry in the Modjokuto area,
a fairly stable equilibrium seems to have existed between a relatively
low (for Java) though growing population and a relatively low (also
for Java) level of agricultural production. The sugar industries
with their policies made possible, in about thirty years, the establish-
ment of a new equilibrium with a much higher population, probably
about the same per capita income, and little increase in peasant
capital (aside from irrigation facilities) or skills, a pattern of
socio-economic change, J, H. Boeke, the Dutch economist, has aptly
called "static or stationary expansioa"
In any case, it seems clear that in any discussion of the future
development of the Modjokuto region, and other regions of Java as well,
the role of commercial, "capitalist" agriculture must certainly be
a central concern. One naturally asks: how much of the pre-war result
of the contact of plantation agriculture and village life was inherent
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in capital-intensive agriculture as such, and how much was a product
of the political context in which the contact occurred? Is a more
beneficent role in the process of social change possible for planta-
tion agriculture under altered political conditions, or is plantation
agriculture an inherently "anti-welfare" form of economic activity?
But the term "plantation agriculture," taken as a simple whole,
conceals elements which need to be distinguished before one can talk
meaningfully about its possible role in ModjokutoIs future. Following
Sir Alan Pim, we might distinguish three main stages in the supply of
arr agricultural product to a distant consumer: the cultivation of
the plant, its processing and its marketing, noting that "at each of
these stages the rival systems of plantation and peasant production
have relative advantages and disadvantages." In the pre-war period,
the vertical integration policies of the plantation companies kept
these three stages under unified, European, control, a policy which,
as we have emphasized, maximizes the contrast between the "capitalist"
and "pre-capitalist" spheres of activity. Conse quently, one might ask
whether dissolution of the tight bond between cultivation, processing
and marketing might make for a more workable relationship between
peasant and commercial agriculture0 Particularly in the matter of
cultivation it has been argued that a division of labor in which
peasant organization-cooperatives, unions, etc -r-were mainly
responsible for cultivation and sugar companies for processing would
lead to a healthier situation
The question involved in such a re-organization is, of course:
how far must efficiency fall? If free-hold cane growing is combined
with highly capitalized milling will the low output and poor quality
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of the former make the latter unable to justify Its high fixed costs?
Largely, this depends upon whether the technical kill a of cultivation
heretofore associated with the mills can be transferred to the
peasantry, or, in the short rune that a mode of cooperation between
the mills anfd peasants organised in cooperatives, unions and the ik
can be worked out whioh will allow the skills and capital of the
sugar technisians to be effectively applied to the land of the peasant.
without redwing the latter simply to passive pawns in the procete#
If democratia peasant unions can gain control over larger tracts df
-land and work out relations with the sugar industry wlhich are mutually
profitable to both groups, it is possible that the cost-vutting
advantages of scientific management and capital intensification might
be effectively combined with peasant freedom and progress*
That this is not more utopian fantasy, is evidenced by the fact
that just this sort of development has begun to occur, as yet not to
ar important degree in Modjokuto itself, but in the next two or three
subdistricts to the northwest of itj* At least tuo sorts of program
are in operation in these villages, one somewhat more conservativo
than the other. In the more tonservative cas44 a peasant organization
rents land from its members which it then rents in turn to the sugar
mille, Thus, the organization acts as a go-between for the peasantv5
but the actual peasant participation is only slightly greater than
before the war. In the second program, sugar is grovn by the richer
peasants, a few of whom have as much as a hundred and fifty acres of
land, under the supervision of the mills working through a Government
sponsored and regulated peasant coeop. The co-op makes the price
Apt
contract ith the mills, gets an advance, is responsible for delivery
and attempts to insure quality, partly by permitting the sugar
managers to advise the peasants, inspect the cane in the fields and
so forth,
Nevertheless, this is not a brief for the sugar industry.
Whether or not, and how far, the sugar industry can or ought to be
revived, depends on a host of economic and other factors-demand,
market organization, costs, possibilities and political practicabiliZ
ties of food imports, etc-which I do not wish to prejudgeo I have
used the sugar industry merely as an example of a type of industry
processing primary products whiclh seems to me to have an important
role to play in the development of the Indonesian economy. Liki
generals planning for the last war, "underdeveloped economists" have
a tendency to plan for the last industrial revolution. Sugar i s not,
by far,, the only processing industry which can be developed on the
basis of crops cultivable in Javanese terraces and gardens:: soya,
coconuts, palm oil, kapok, tobacco, coffee, cacao, fibres of various
sorts, and many other crops offer possibilities for such industries,
particularly if more capital can be invested in sc.ientific studies
of tropical agriculture and of technological methods to process the
output. Whether it be soft drinks,, candy bars, cigarettes, soup,
soya-bean cake or kapok-filled pillows, a non-exploitative integra-
tion between an advanced technology and Javanese primary production
in agriculture is not without possible significance for the future
growth of the Indonesian economy.
Clifford Geertz
